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Anti-terrorism politics and the risk of provoking
Franz Dietrich1
May 2008
Abstract. A populations level of terrorism depends on two factors: peoples
preferences (would they like creating damage?) and the constraints under which
people act (what damage could they create, and at what punishment?). Cause-
related policies, e.g. improving social stability or education, aim at appeasing
preferences, thereby reducing terrorism. Symptom-related policies, e.g. embar-
goes or wars, change the constraints (deterrence), but may have side e¤ects
on preferences (provocation); terrorism increases if provocation overweighs de-
terrence. I model preferences for damage as endogenous and policy-dependent.
I argue that provocation by tough policies is easy to overlook, and show that
provocation-neglect leads to toughness-exaggeration.
Keywords. Endogenous preferences, reciprocity, dynamic inconsistency, ter-
rorism
1 Introduction
Rational-choice-based crime prevention models2 do usually not carry over as
such to the problem of terrorism prevention; here, a di¤erent approach is due,
or so I claim. The reason is the phenomenon of provocation, which terrorism
politics faces to a larger extent than crime politics. Provocation, as construed
in this paper, is the development of a desire to create damage in response to
the policy (e.g. to a war). In order to account for provocation, a model must
endogenise the (degree of) damage-proneness of individuals. Why is provocation
a crucial ingredient when modelling terrorism, more so than when modelling
regular criminality? The answer lies in the motivation underlying terrorism.
The motivation underlying regular crimes is typically not related to the policy
makers but to monetary or other material advantages (for property crimes) or
to emotions about certain persons (for hate crimes). By contrast, a terrorists
motivation is often related to (his feelings about) those cultures, governments or
countries that are in charge of the anti-terrorism policy or are associated with it.
So, the motivation underlying terrorism can be a¤ected (i.e., created, increased,
or reduced) by the anti-terrorism policy, whereas the motivation driving regular
crimes might be exogenously given. In short, theft is not motivated by hate
against those pursuing thieves, but terrorism may be motivated by hate against
those pursuing terrorists, and this hate may be provoked by the policy itself
1Maastricht University & LSE. Homepage: www.personeel.unimaas.nl/f.dietrich
2See Michael Tonry (1998) for an overview of the empirical and theoretical crime literature.
(particularly, by toughness). As a result, policy makers and our models should
(i) treat an individuals desire to create terrorism as instable and endogenously
responding to the policy, and (ii) focus not only on individuals with currently
brutal desires but also on currently peaceful individuals who might be provoked.
This theoretical paper proposes such a model. It shows that the policy
maker faces a trade-o¤ between deterrence and provocation, and compares
provocation-aware with provocation-neglecting policies. Being not empirical,
the paper makes no concrete claims on the size of the provocation e¤ect of con-
temporary or past anti-terrorism policies, nor on whether these policies resem-
ble more the provocation-aware or the provocation-neglecting policies analysed
here. But I argue that provocation is indeed easy to systematically overlook
in practice, and I show that provocation-neglect leads to toughness exaggera-
tion. The paper is organised into an informal part (Section 2) that introduces
some key ideas, and a formal part (Section 3) that provides the mathematical
foundations, among other things giving su¢ cient conditions under which the
marginal e¤ect of toughness is the sum of a terrorism-reducing deterrence e¤ect
and a terrorism-increasing provocation e¤ect.
Although provocation by anti-terrorism policies is discussed in political sci-
ence and sociology (and by people on the streets), it has to my knowledge not
been investigated formally in a rational-choice-based model. In focussing on
provocation and modelling it as a form of preference/taste change, I take the
approach of the economic literature on endogenous preferences. The instability
of tastes and their endogenous determination by environmental factors such as
governmental policies or institutions is increasingly recognised and modelled
in economics (e.g. Robert Polak 1976, Sven Ove Hansson 1995, Gary Becker
1996, Samuel Bowles 1998, Natthew Rabin 1998, Dekel et al. 2007). It is im-
portant to incorporate this approach into terrorism modelling, because dispo-
sitions towards terrorism seem particularly instable and environment-sensitive
in that they typically reect complex mental states rather than basic biological
attributes or needs.
Provocation as modelled here (that is: the emergence of a desire to create
damage in response to a policy, e.g. to a war) can be interpreted either as a
rational taste change, derived from stable extended preferences over extended
alternatives that contain the policy as a taste parameter, or as a dynami-
cally inconsistent taste change. The rst interpretation allows one to explain
provocation by a stable desire to reciprocate, i.e. to harm tough policy makers
(countries, cultures etc.) and to be mild to soft ones. Violent responses to
tough anti-terrorism policies might indeed be regarded as typical cases of the
phenomenon of reciprocity, whose rational-choice foundations are increasingly
understood (e.g. Matthew Rabin 1993, Ernst Fehr and Simon Gächter 1998,
Gary Bolton and Axel Ockenfels 2000, Rajiv Sethi and E. Somanathan 2001
and 2003, Martin Dufwenberg and Georg Kirchsteiger 2004 and Armin Falk
and Urs Fischbacher 2006). The second interpretation of provocation, namely
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dynamic inconsistency, stresses the e¤ect that anti-terrorism policies can have
on someones personality and psychological state. The idea is here that some-
one who before a new policy comes into action (e.g. before the escalation of a
war) still has no desire whatsoever to exercise violence not even against tough
policy makers, i.e. without reciprocal feelings ex ante might nevertheless de-
velop brutal preferences under the new policy environment. This is a typical
example of developing a new self over time under new environments, resulting
in dynamic inconsistency (e.g. Robert Strotz 1955-56, Peter Hammond 1976,
Edward ODonoghue and Matthew Rabin 1999, Roland Bénabou and Marek
Pycia 2002). One might defend such an interpretation of provocation against
one in terms of stable reciprocal preferences by invoking the radical and insane
nature of the ex post attitude of creating terrorism: arguably, terrorists were
not already born with the insane desire to perform terrorist attacks if future
circumstances are such and such. This reasoning resembles that leading some
economists to use dynamic inconsistency when modelling drug addiction: ar-
guably, an addict was not already born with the insane desire that his future
self, if addicted, consumes heroin. Psychological and empirical research will
have to tell whether provocation by tough anti-terrorism policies reects reci-
procity or a dynamically inconsistent personality change; the answer might well
be context- and person-specic. Importantly, our formal model is open to both
explanations.
By standing in the tradition of the endogenous preference literature, this
paper is little related to existing work on terrorism prevention in political econ-
omy. One branch of this eld is empirical and investigates potential causes
of terrorism (e.g. William Eubank and Leonard Weinberg 1994, Andrew Silke
1994, and Lloyd Dumas 2002). A more theoretical branch analyses concrete
policy measures based on their e¢ ciency in reducing terrorism and/or their
costs, without incorporating provocation but accounting for several incentives
and usually focussing on more specic problems than here (e.g. Claudio Cio¢ -
Revilla 1985 and 1998, Bruno Frey 2004, Walter Enders and Todd Sandler 2006).
This empirical and theoretical literature provides several important insights not
reviewed here; future research might combine them with the provocation e¤ects
studied here.
2 Informal analysis
Throughout the paper we consider a policy maker (e.g. a national government
or international organisation) in charge of choosing and implementing an anti-
terrorism policy. The term anti-terrorism policy is understood in a broad
sense (made precise in Sections 2.2 and 2.3), possibly including social or educa-
tional institutions, military interventions, police presence, criminal legislation
and jurisdiction, declarations and speeches by politicians, diplomatic relations
or embargoes, and so on.
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The terrorism threat comes from the members of a (non-empty nite) set of
individuals N , called the population. Crucially, N contains not just individuals
currently engaged in terrorist activities (arguably a frequent mistake) but also
all potential ones. This speaks for a large denition of N : it might include all
humans on earth, or some group dened geographically, ethnically, religiously,
or else. The term individualalways refers to members of N .
In response to the policy, each individual engages in some behaviour, which
can be more or less violent; he3 might exercise no violence at all, or perform
small o¤ences, or major terrorist attacks, and so on. I assume that an individual
cares about two consequences of his behaviour: (i) a level of damage created,
represented by a real number x  0, and (ii) a level of punishment received,
represented by another real number y  0. The particular form punishment
takes is irrelevant; it could be any personal disadvantage (cost) incurred, such
as having to hide from authorities (before or after damage creation), having to
prepare the attack, or coming to prison afterwards. Usually, most individuals
behave so as to obtain the no-damage-no-punishment outcome (x; y) = (0; 0).
I use the term terrorist resp. non-terrorist in a technical sense to denote
someone who causes positive damage x > 0 resp. zero damage x = 0 (without
intending any further connotations that this sensitive terminology may have
in normal language). Although I say throughout that someone chooseshis
damage-punishment pair (x; y), this pair is in fact the outcome not just of
own behaviour but also of the policy: damage x might depend on the level of
protection of targets, and punishment y on criminal legislation. (In practice,
the outcome (x; y) might further depend on chance, a case we could capture by
re-interpreting (x; y) as an expected-damage-expected-punishment pair.4)
2.1 Peaceful vs. brutal preferences
Suppose a given policy is in action. As usual in economics, I assume that
individual behaviour is guided by preference. Accordingly, let each individual i
in the population N hold some preference order5 i on the set
R2+ = [0;1) [0;1) = f(x; y) : x  0; y  0g (damage-punishment quadrant)
of damage-punishment pairs (x; y); the associated relations of strict preference
 and indi¤erence  are dened as usual.6 As illustrated in Figure 1, some
3Throughout I use masculine pronouns, without intended gender restriction.
4To make the following analysis compatible with this re-interpretation, one would need
two technical assumptions: (i) an individuals behaviour leads to a probability distribution
on R2+ that possesses a nite expectation in each coordinate; (ii) the individual ranks such
probability distributions (behaviours) on the basis of their expectation pairs. Moreover,
feasible sets (introduced below) should be re-interpreted as sets of feasible expectation pairs.
5Throughout, preference orderrefers to a transitive and complete binary relation.
6For all (x; y); (x0; y0) 2 R2+, we have (x; y)  (x0; y0), [(x; y)  (x0; y0) and not (x0; y0) 
(x; y)], and (x; y)  (x0; y0), [(x; y)  (x0; y0) and (x0; y0)  (x; y)].
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individuals might hold peaceful preferences, others brutal ones. Formally, I call
a preference order  (on the damage-punishment quadrant R2+)
 peaceful if less damage is preferred to more ceteris paribus, i.e. if (x; y) 
(x0; y) whenever x < x0, and brutal otherwise.
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Figure 1: A peaceful and two brutal preferences (all three punishment-averse)
Someones preference whether peaceful or brutal  is usually punishment-
averse, where I call a preference order  (on the damage-punishment quadrant
R2+)
 punishment-averse if less punishment is preferred to more ceteris paribus,
i.e. if (x; y)  (x; y0) whenever y < y0.
Given punishment-aversion (which I assume throughout the informal discus-
sion), the di¤erence between peaceful and brutal preferences shows in the slope
of indi¤erence curves: peaceful preferences have negatively sloped indi¤erence
curves (rst plot in Figure 1), whereas brutal preferences have positively sloped
indi¤erence curves at least somewhere on the quadrant R2+ (second and third
plot in Figure 1). By anti-clockwise rotating the indi¤erence curves, preference
becomes more brutal, where I have in a natural way (partially) ordered the
preference orders on R2+ in terms of brutality:
  is at least as brutal (or at most peaceful) as 0 if any preference for
higher damage that holds under 0 also holds under , i.e. if (x; y) 0
(x0; y0) and x > x0 imply (x; y)  (x0; y0).
In this sense, the preference on the right of Figure 1 is more brutal than that in
the middle, which is more brutal than that on the left. A radical form of brutal
preferences  are ones with
 insatiable damage desire, i.e. (x; y)  (x0; y) whenever x > x0,
in which case indi¤erence curves are positively sloped on the entire quadrantR2+
(third plot in Figure 1). (One might speculate whether some suicide bombers
have insatiable damage desire.) The more moderate forms of brutal preferences
are ones with a strictly positive but nite optimal damage level x (which might
depend on punishment y), where preference typically decreases as damage x
moves away from the optimum in either direction holding y xed (see second
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plot in Figure 1). For instance, someone might desire to destroy a building, but
preferably without killing humans.
Each anti-terrorism policy results in some (non-empty) set F  R2+ of fea-
sible damage-punishment pairs from which individuals have to choose. Figure
2 and later gures take the feasible set F to be thinand linear and to render
every damage level x  0 feasible (nothing of which is essential7), with the
plausible feature that punishment increases with damage and that no-damage-
no-punishment (0; 0) is feasible. Figure 2 shows how three types of individuals
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Figure 2: Behaviour of one peaceful and two brutal types under the policy
behave under the policy (all maximising preference): the peaceful type on the
left creates no damage (is not a terrorist), the strongly brutal type on the right
creates positive damage (is a terrorist), and the moderately brutal type in the
middle creates no damage (but would have been a terrorist under only slightly
more brutal preferences).
2.2 Cause-related and symptom-related policy measures
A policy measure can qualify as part of the anti-terrorism policy if, through
whatever means, it a¤ects the damage level created by individuals. Someones
damage level x is determined by two factors: (i) his preference order  on
the damage-punishment quadrant R2+ and (ii) the feasible set F  R2+ from
which he chooses. This naturally leads me to distinguish between two sorts
of anti-terrorism policy measures, to be labelled cause-relatedor symptom-
related(without the derogative connotation that the term symptom-related
sometimes has in natural language):
 A cause-related or appeasement measure aims at changing the preferences
of population members, not the constraints F  R2+ under which they
can create terrorism. The goal is that brutal preferences become peaceful
(as on the right in Figure 3) or at least less brutal (as on the left in
Figure 3). Examples of such preference-appeasement attempts might be
7Feasible sets are discussed in full generality in Section 3.1.
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to improve education or the standard of living, reduce polarisation, allow
people to sympathise with those persons, cultures or institutions against
which terrorism might be directed, or render terrorism less desirable by
reducing media attention as Bruno Frey (2004) advocates.
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Figure 3: A succesful cause-related policy measure (new preference dashed)
 A symptom-related or deterrence measure aims to reduce terrorism by
changing the constraints F  R2+ under which terrorists operate (possibly
with brutalising side e¤ects on peoples preferences, as analysed in the next
subsection). Roughly, such measures render the feasible set F steeper,
and perhaps render some damage levels x infeasible.8 Such measures can
be defensive or aggressive. Defensive measures change the di¢ culty of
creating damages x, for instance by erecting weapons embargoes, protect-
ing buildings, supervising public places, enforcing transparency in bank
transfers, or decentralising society to make it less vulnerable as Bruno
Frey (2004) proposes. Aggressive measures change the kind or extent of
punishment y, for instance by severe legislation, a worldwide search for
terrorists, or a war. While there may be overlaps, the di¤erence between
defensive and aggressive deterrence can be formalised (see Section 4).
2.3 Symptom-related measures and the problem of provo-
cation (side) e¤ects
The rest of the paper (except Appendix A) analyses symptom-related policy
measures as just dened. As Figure 4 illustrates, additional toughness does
not lead to more terrorism if peoples preferences are guaranteed to be non-
provocable, i.e. policy-invariant. However, as Figure 5 illustrates, symptom-
related policies often a¤ect not just the setF  R2+ of feasible damage-punishment
pairs but (as side e¤ects) also some individualspreferences. The same individ-
ual who in the status quo still holds peaceful preferences  on R2+ (hence is not
8Damage level x  0 is feasible if (x; y) 2 F for some punishment y  0. Some policies
(e.g. weapons embargoes) render high damage levels infeasible; see Section 3.1.
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Figure 4: E¤ect of a toughness raise on three types of non-provocable individuals
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Figure 5: E¤ect of a toughness raise on three types of provocable individuals
a terrorist) might develop brutal preferences 0 onR2+ under a new tougher pol-
icy. It is psychologically plausible and empirically observable that some persons
preference for or against exercising violence is not stable but reacts to the envi-
ronment: some environments appease, others brutalise tastes and desires. The
anti-terrorism policy may form part of the environment that shapes someones
personality and preferences. A policy may let someone develop hate feelings
and a preference for creating damage, either in order to hurt the policy-makers
themselves (if the hate feelings focus on them) or without a specic target (if the
hate feelings are more di¤use). Such provocation is given two interpretations
in Section 2.4, namely in terms of either dynamic inconsistency or extended
preferences over damage-punishment-policy triples (the latter interpretation of-
fering two perfectly rational explanations of provocation: reciprocity and taste
acquisition).
This said, an individuals preference order on the damage-punishment quad-
rant R2+ should be indexed by the policy t, say t with t ranging over a set T of
relevant (symptom-related) policies among which the status quo policy t. Here,
t represents the individuals (more or less peaceful) dispositions under (the
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impression of) policy t. I call an individual, or the family of his policy-indexed
preference orders (t)t2T on R2+,
 unprovocable if preference t is the same for each policy t 2 T ;
 provocable otherwise.9
This denition of provocability leaves open the direction of the preference
reaction. In principle, provocation could even take the inverse form that tough
policies appease preferences (such as when someone becomes unable to touch a
knife after the traumatic experience of a war); this psychological reaction, later
referred to as inverse provocation, is possible but seems less frequent.
If one were to decompose someones preferences into a damage-related utility
and a punishment-related utility, say, through an additively separable utility
model ut(x; y) = vt(x) + wt(y) as in Appendix A, then one is led to ask: does
provocability come rather from damage utility vt(x) being policy-sensitive, or
rather from punishment utility wt(y) being policy-sensitive? Certainly, utility
derived from terrorism vt(x) seems more likely to be policy-sensitive: while the
pain from a xed punishment level y seems policy-invariant, the pleasure of
creating a xed damage x highly depends on how much the person dislikes the
policy makers (cultures, etc.) he hurts, which may be policy-sensitive.
How does a policy toughening a¤ect terrorism? As illustrated in Figure 4,
the behaviour of unprovocable individuals is a¤ected in a desirable way: non-
terrorists stay non-terrorists, and terrorists reduce damage, possibly becoming
non-terrorists. Such deterrence without provocation is extensively studied in the
crime and terrorism literature, using di¤erent models. For provocable types, the
picture changes and becomes less uniform. Damage increases for types where
provocation outweighs deterrence (rst two plots of Figure 5), but decreases for
types where deterrence outweighs provocation (third plot in Figure 5). In Figure
6, I decompose the total e¤ect of the toughness rise on a terrorists damage into
 a (usually negative) deterrence e¤ect, representing the damage change if,
hypothetically, preferences were to remain constant, and
 a (usually positive) provocation e¤ect, caused by preference change.
There is no general rule as to which of these two competing e¤ects is stronger;
for the type on the left (right) in Figure 6, provocation (deterrence) is stronger.
The same decomposition also works for non-terrorists: the deterrence e¤ect is
then zero (less than no damagedoesnt exist) but the provocation e¤ect might
be positive, turning the person into a terrorist.
I shall be formal in Section 3 about the decomposition into deterrence and
provocation. But qualitatively, what can we learn already now? If the popula-
tion is approximately homogeneous, the policy maker can reduce terrorism by
adjusting the policy to the predominant type; for instance, high toughness is
9This terminology makes sense since T consists of symptom-related policies. But if poli-
cies may di¤er also (or only) in cause-related measures (e.g. in the education system), the
more general term (un)changeable is better than (un)provocable. Changing (appeasing)
preferences is the whole point of cause-related anti-terrorism policies.
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Figure 6: Deterrence e¤ect and porvocation e¤ect
e¢ cient against a population dominated by types that are unprovocable (see
Figure 4) or little provocable (see right plots in Figures 5 and 6). Often though,
the population is signicantly heterogeneous and contains many types (pref-
erences), some more provocable than others, some peaceful and others brutal
in the status quo. Then the policy maker faces the di¢ cult task of nding
the right compromise given the type distribution. As a rule of thumb, optimal
toughness is decreasing as a function of the level of provocability and increasing
as a function of the level of (status quo) brutality in the type distribution. More
precisely, a policy shift from the status quo t to some new policy t 2 T min-
imises sum-total terrorism, as given by the sum x =
X
i2N
xi of damage levels
xi across individuals i 2 N , if and only if it minimises the policys aggregate
e¤ect on damage (i.e. the change of x from the status quo). This e¤ect can
be decomposed into the sum DE(t) +PE(t) of the aggregate deterrence e¤ect
DE(t) and the aggregate provocation e¤ect PE(t).10 DE(t) and PE(t) mea-
sure how much policy t a¤ects terrorism through deterrence and provocation,
respectively. In practice, the policy maker faces two distinct challenges:
Finding the right level of toughness. Suppose the policy maker decides on a
single policy parameter (e.g. the size of a military intervention), so that we
can identify policies with toughness levels t chosen from a one-dimensional pol-
icy space T  R. As Figure 7 illustrates, in trying to minimise the function
DE(t)+PE(t), the policy maker faces a standard one-dimensional trade-o¤be-
cause DE(t) is decreasing but PE(t) increasing in toughness t (for details, see
Section 3). A minimum of DE(t) +PE(t) denes an optimum on the trade-o¤
between deterrence and provocation. Overshooting toughness increases terror-
ism by provoking too much, and undershooting toughness increases terrorism
10That is, DE(t) =
X
i2N DEi(t) where DEi(t) is individual is deterrence e¤ect, dened
as his change of damage holding his preferences xed, i.e. neglecting provocation. Similarly,
PE(t) is the sum of the individual provocation e¤ects PEi(t), i 2 N .
10
0
cost-
including
optimum
toughness t
PE (t )
Cost (t )
DE (t )
DE (t ) + PE (t ) + Cost (t )
DE (t ) + PE (t ) (cost-excluding
objective function)
(cost-including
objective function)
toughness
quostatus
terrorism
leastwith
toughness
t
Figure 7: An example in which reducing toughness reduces terrorism
by deterring too little. As also illustrated in Figure 7, a rened objective func-
tion might be DE(t)+PE(t)+Cost(t), where Cost(t) represents the (suitably
scaled) cost of toughness t (such as nancial costs, loss of human lives, and
loss of life quality through state supervision). As Cost(t) typically increases in
toughness t, the optimum is typically reached at lower toughness than under
the cost-neglecting objective function DE(t) + PE(t). In short, toughness t
should be the lower, the steeper the PE(t) curve is (more provocability), the
atter the DE(t) curve is (less deterrability), and the steeper the cost curve
Cost(t) is (more costly toughness).
Finding the right kind of toughness. Suppose now that a policy t is given by
many policy parameters: criminal legislation, weapons embargoes, police pres-
ence, military interventions, and so on. This may be represented by a multi-
dimensional policy space T .11 Interestingly, the same level of deterrence i.e.
the same set F of feasible damage-punishment pairs, hence the same deterrence
e¤ect DE(t) is often achievable by several policies t 2 T that di¤er in their
dimension-specic toughness levels and thereby provoke in di¤erent ways and
to di¤erent overall extents PE(t): some of these policies may lead to peace-
ful preferences on R2+ for most individuals, others to many brutal preferences.
On which dimensions should the policy be tough, on which mild? Our model
recommends a policy that achieve its overall level of deterrence in the least pro-
voking way, which is implemented by allocating toughness to dimensions where
deterrence comes with little provocation. The reason is that di¤erent policies
t with same aggregate deterrence e¤ect DE(t) can be compared based just on
their aggregate provocation e¤ect PE(t) (possibly plus policy costs Cost(t)).
For instance, if introducing a weapons embargo leaves most individualsprefer-
ences either totally unchanged (as in Figure 3) or brutalises them just slightly
in the sense that deterrence overweighs provocation (as in the right plots of
Figures 5 and 6), then this toughness raise is desirable, and preferable to other
11That is, T  Rk, where a policy is seen as a vector t = (t1; :::; tk), and t1 is the level of
toughness of 1st kind, t2 that of 2nd kind, and so on.
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ones that deter equally but provoke more.12 Whether overall deterrence should
be high (i.e. F should be steep) is context-dependent.
2.4 Provocable preferences: a case of rationality or of
dynamic inconsistency?
What can make someones preference over damage-punishment pairs react to
the policy (e.g. to a war)? I deliberately leave the papers analysis compatible
with two classical economic interpretations of preference change: dynamic in-
consistency, and what I call rational taste change in deference to Gary Beckers
terminology.
Rational taste change: reciprocity and acquired tastes. Under this interpreta-
tion, an individuals policy-dependent preference orders t, t 2 T , (on the
damage-punishment quadrant R2+) are derived from a single stable extended
preference order ~ over the set R2+  T of damage-punishment-policy triples
(x; y; t), in which t plays the role of a taste parameter : for each t 2 T , (x; y) t
(x0; y0) then simply means that (x; y; t) ~(x0; y0; t), i.e. that the individual prefers
having (x; y) with policy t to having (x0; y0) with policy t (just as someone might
prefer white to red wine with desert, though perhaps not with cheese). Such
extended preferences can rationalise provocation, in at least two ways. First,
there may be a desire to reciprocate, i.e. to be violent to tough policy mak-
ers (foreigners, etc.) and peaceful to mild ones. Second, the ability to enjoy
terrorism may be acquired, namely through experiencing the policy, e.g. a war
(just as a consumer à la Becker acquires the ability to enjoy a good by building
up a stock of social and personal capital); note that taste acquisition does not
imply dynamic inconsistency (just as the Becker consumer is not dynamically
inconsistent: he anticipates his future abilities). The indi¤erence curves of t
(plotted in our gures) are derived from the higher-dimensional indi¤erence sets
of ~ (in the space R2+T ) by xing the third coordinatet, i.e. by intersecting
with the subspace R2+  ftg.
Dynamic inconsistency. A dynamically inconsistent agent disapproves of his
own future preference: he undergoes a personality change under the impression
of the changing environment (policy), and his preference change is not rep-
resentable by stable extended preferences (or stable intertemporal preferences
over complete event streams). To illustrate, suppose the policy changes from
the status quo mild(t) to tough(t). How would someone whose preference
changes from peaceful(t) to brutal(t) describe himself before the change?
 In the earlier case of rational taste change, he might say: I want and will
always want to harm tough foreigners and to be kind to mild ones, and
12The embargo does indeed deter: the feasible set F  R2+ gets steeperbecause damage
creation gets harder (if feasible at all) and more criminal (so more highly punished).
12
so I am currently not a terrorist but intend to become one whenever the
foreigners becomes tough.
 In the case of dynamic inconsistency, he might say: I am currently a
pacist who does not want to harm any mild or tough foreigners, and I
wish I could prevent that, once foreigners become tough, my personality
changes and I develop a desire to harm them.
More formally, the persons present preference about his future damage-
punishment under future policy t are given by:
 present taste t in the case of dynamic inconsistency;
 future taste t in the case of rational taste change;
 some combination of t and t in mixed cases.
Empirically, the di¤erence between these kinds of preference change is re-
vealed in commitment behaviour.13 In economics, dynamic inconsistency is
often associated with individuals whose mental state is subjected to chocks or
inuences, either of an external kind (brutal friends, war) or an internal kind
(Alzheimer, puberty). In this sense, provocation seems a natural candidate for
dynamic inconsistency.
Which explanation of provocation, then, is appropriate? Answers are likely
to be both context-dependent and controversial; the reader might choose his or
her preferred explanation. It might even be that (within the same application)
some individuals undergo a rational taste change and others a dynamic incon-
sistency. It is thus important that our model of provocation is not committed
to one interpretation only.
The origin of provocation matters in at least two ways. First, it may de-
termine the manner in which provocability should be empirically measured or
tested. Second, it becomes behaviourally relevant in extensions of our model.
Why so? The present model can leave the question open essentially because
each individual gets to choose only once a damage-punishment pair, namely af-
ter the new policy is implemented, and so only his then-preference matters for
behaviour, regardless of how it came about. However, in an extended model of
repeated interaction between policy maker and population, the origin of provo-
cation a¤ects individual strategies, hence optimal policies to prevent terrorism.
2.5 The fallacy of neglecting provocation
Provocation e¤ects of policies are easy to overlook in practice, for systematic
reasons given in a moment. Probably they are being overlooked or underesti-
mated in contemporary anti-terrorism politics, but this is an empirical claim
13Dynamically inconsistent (forward-looking) agents may choose to commit themselves,
even if commitment comes with a cost. E.g. Robert Strotz (1955-56) and Peter Hammond
(1976).
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that this theoretical paper cannot defend. Rather, let me briey discuss (i)
consequences of and (ii) explanations for provocation-neglect.
Consequence of provocation-neglect: toughness exaggeration. (The rigorous
treatment comes in Section 3.4.) A provocation-neglecting policy maker min-
imises the wrong objective function since he wrongly predicts peoples response
to the policy. He assumes people keep their old (status quo) preferences under
the new policy: peacefully minded persons stay peacefully minded, brutally
minded persons stay equally brutally minded. This leads the provocation-
neglecting policy maker to minimise DE(t) + Cost(t) rather than DE(t) +
PE(t) + Cost(t), where, as in Section 2.3, DE(t), PE(t) and Cost(t) denote
the aggregate deterrence e¤ect, the aggregate provocation e¤ect, and the cost
of policy t 2 T , respectively. Since PE(t) is an increasing function of toughness
toughness t0
PE (t )
Cost (t )
DE (t )
DE (t ) + PE (t ) + Cost (t )
provocation-
aware
new toughness
DE (t ) + Cost (t ) (provocation-neglecting
objective function)
(provocation-aware
objective function)
provocation-
neglecting
new toughness
toughness
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Figure 8: An example in which provocation-neglect leads to a toughness raise,
but provocation-awareness to a toughness reduction
(see Theorem 1 below), the provocation-neglecting policy maker is tougher than
would be optimal, as Figure 8 illustrates in the case of a one-dimensional policy
choice problem. Such toughness exaggeration due to provocation-neglect may
be called the fallacy of neglecting provocation.
Explaining provocation-neglect. Is provocation-neglect an elementary mistake
that cannot be expected to occur among policy makers? On the contrary,
provocation-neglect may be a tempting error, almost like a trap wide open in
front the policy maker who can avoid it only by particular serenity. The reason
is that peoples provocability may be little visible before the new policy (e.g.
before a war): it is not (yet) revealed in behaviour, perhaps not even in speech,
especially if provocation comes from dynamic inconsistency (see Section 2.4). In
a relatively mild status quo environment, individuals who would develop brutal
preferences if the policy were toughened may display perfectly sane and harm-
less behaviour, and even declare the peacefulness of their intensions. It certainly
takes special serenity and psychological and cultural sensitivity to foresee if and
how a policy would provoke those subgroups who so far behave peacefully and
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whose (dynamically inconsistent) members are perhaps even themselves un-
aware of being provocable.
Do there exist indirect ways to nevertheless observeor testbeforehand if
and how people would be provoked by new policies? In now briey address this
question.
First, consider speech-revelation: can one trust someones speech about what
he would desire or do under such and such new policy? Speech-revealed prefer-
ences, which many economists legitimately treat with caution, may be particu-
larly unreliable here, for two reasons:
 A person might not sincerely reveal the brutality of his future preferences
or actions, by fear of the consequences of making his criminal side known.
 We are dealing here with revealing not the present preference order (over
damage-punishment pairs), but future preferences held under potential
new policies. Revealing these is in principle possible, and might be real-
istic under the reciprocity interpretation because then the future desires
already exist presently in the form of conditional preferences. But the
plausibility of revealing future preferences decreases if these preferences
arise by dynamic inconsistency (or by rationally acquired tastes): the
person might then not be aware that a new environment would turn him
into a terrorist, also given that this drastic event would presumably be
unprecedented in his life.
Second, while speech-revelation is thus limited as a tool to measureprovo-
cability, certain past observations may serve as proxis to estimate provocability.
Similar policies might in the past have been used in similar contexts and on
similar populations (though many culture- and context-specic factors would
have to be controlled for). Also, the population might in the past have displayed
certain (more or less violent) behavioural patterns in response to environments
(such as more or less rough social environments) that, though not identical to
the policy-induced environments, resemble them. In the best case scenario, past
data allow one to statistically estimate, for each policy t 2 T , the populations
resulting distribution of preferences t.
3 Formal analysis
The above informal analysis draws on some claims, in particular about the
signs of two competing e¤ects of toughness on terrorism: the provocation e¤ect
is typically non-negative, the deterrence e¤ect typically non-positive. But what
means typically? I take this question up now by giving su¢ cient conditions
for these claims to hold. A social welfare analysis of toughness will also conrm
the earlier claim that provocation-neglect leads to toughness exaggeration.
To draw a comparison rst, Slutskys fundamental equation of demand the-
ory decomposes the e¤ect of a price increase on demand into two conceptually
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distinct e¤ects, the income e¤ect and a substitution e¤ect. We pursue a similar
goal in decomposing the e¤ect of toughness on terrorism (damage) into two
conceptually distinct e¤ects, deterrence and provocation. In spite of obvious
di¤erences, our approach shares some key aspects with Slutskys:
(i) The primary level of description is the individual: the e¤ect of a price/toughness
raise on overall demand/terrorism is obtained by aggregating the e¤ect on indi-
vidual demand/terrorism. Accordingly, much of this section focusses on a single
individual, with the understanding that one could later aggregate.
(ii) The e¤ect of a price/toughness change can be analysed either by com-
paring the status quo price/toughness with a xed new price/toughness, as
done in textbook discussions of Slutskys decomposition and in Section 2, or
by considering a marginal price/toughness change, i.e. by di¤erentiating de-
mand/terrorism with respect to price/toughness, as done in Slutskys equation
and in this section.
(iii) Each sube¤ect has a typical sign, yet there are exceptions, such as
income e¤ects getting positive for inferior goods and provocation e¤ects getting
negative for inversely provocable individuals.
(iv) The two sube¤ects are constructed by means of a thought experiment
involving hypothetical behaviour: the substitution (resp. deterrence) e¤ect
represents how a price (resp. toughness) change would a¤ect demand (resp.
terrorism) if, hypothetically, the individuals achieved utility level (resp. his
preference order ) did not change.
3.1 Framework, terminology, notation
Throughout we consider the following sequence of events. First the policy maker
chooses a policy t from a given set T of possible policies, among which the
status quo policy t. Each policy t 2 T leads to a set Ft  R2+ of feasible
damage-punishment pairs (x; y). Under the environment of policy t 2 T , each
individual i in the (nite non-empty) population N holds some (complete and
transitive) preference order t;i on the damage-punishment quadrant R2+ that
guides his behaviour, i.e. his choice of a damage-punishment pair (x; y) from
the feasible set Ft. I call the policy maker provocation-aware (resp. -neglecting)
if he believes that any policy t 2 T gives any individual i the true preferences
i;t (resp. the status quo preference i;t).
In spite of what the gures in Section 2 might suggest, feasible sets Ft need
neither be linear, nor be thin, nor render all damage levels x 2 R+ feasible. In
general, each feasible set has two by-products: the feasible damage set and the
punishment function, dened and denoted as follows. Policy ts feasible damage
set Xt  R+ is dened as Xt := fx : (x; y) 2 Ft for some y 2 R+g (the
projection of Ft on the x-coordinate), representing what damage is physically
possible under policy t. If Xt = R+, any damage can be created. If Xt ( R+,
the policy physically limits the kind or extent of damage people can create, for
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instance by weapons embargoes or police presence or airport controls, which
make major terrorist attacks simply impossible to create, thus leaving only
the more modesttargets for terrorists. Typically, the feasible damage set Xt
contains at least x = 0 (no damageis feasible) and forms an interval, which
could be unbounded (Xt = R+) or bounded (Xt = [0; xt ] or Xt = [0; x

t ) where
xt is a feasibility bound established by policy t). Policy ts punishment function
ft : Xt ! R+ maps every feasible damage level x 2 Xt to the minimally received
punishment, i.e. ft(x) := inffy : (x; y) 2 Ftg. The graph of the function ft
represents the southern border of the feasible set Ft. An important example
are feasible sets of the (thin) form
Ft = f(x; ft(x)) : x 2 Xtg, t 2 T , (1)
consisting of pairs of a feasible damage x 2 Xt and a unique punishment ft(x);
here each feasible set Ft is thinin that it coincides with the graph of ft.
Typically, a policy ts punishment function ft is increasing: higher punish-
ment for higher damage. Intuitively, the tougher the policy t, the higher the
punishments ft(x); x 2 Xt, and also the fewer the feasible damage levels, i.e.
the smaller Xt. However, it is perfectly possible for two policies in T that one
gives higher punishment yet renders more damage levels feasible, or that one
gives more punishment for some damage levels but less for others; then these
two policies cannot easily be ranked in terms of their toughness or deterrence.
In practice, individuals often have many ways to produce a given damage
x  0 (e.g. many ways to kill someone), and punishment might depend on the
chosen way. Feasible sets do then not take the thinform (1) but the general
form
Ft = f(x; y) 2 R2+ : y 2 Yt(x)g; t 2 T ,
where, for each policy t 2 T and each damage level x  0, Yt(x) is a set
Yt(x)  R+ of punishment levels that can occur in combination with damage
level x. In fact, feasible sets Ft; t 2 T , can always be written in the latter form;
in the thincase (1), each set Yt(x) is singleton (if x is feasible) or empty (if x
is infeasible).
3.2 Marginal provocation e¤ect and deterrence e¤ect
In the rest of Section 3 (but not in Appendix A), the policy maker chooses a
single policy parameter representing the toughness level. More precisely:
Unidimensional Policy Space UP. The set of policies T is an interval T  R
(of toughness levels), and the status quo t 2 T is non-extremal, i.e. not on the
boundary of the interval T .
We consider an individual whose preferencest, t 2 T , are regular as dened
by three conditions:
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R1 (punishment-aversion) For every policy t 2 T , t is punishment-averse,
i.e. (x; y) t (x; y0) whenever y < y0.
R2 (continuity) For every policy t 2 T , t is continuous, hence is (by Debreus
Theorem) representable by a continuous utility function ut : R2+ ! R.
R3 (unique optimum) For all policies t1; t2 2 T , there exists a unique damage-
punishment pair, denoted (x(t1; t2); y(t1; t2)), that maximises t1 within
Ft2 (i.e. that is an optimal response to policy t2 under the preferences
of policy t1), and moreover the damage level x(t1; t2) is a di¤erentiable
function of (t1; t2) 2 T  T .14
The optimisation problem in R3 is hypothetical in that under policy t2 the
individual really maximises t2, not t1; but if we set t1 = t2 = t, we obtain
precisely the individuals real optimisation problem under policy t. Hence, R3
in particular implies that
 to each policy t 2 T the individual has a unique optimal response, to be
denoted (x(t); y(y)) (= (x(t; t); y(t; t))).
So we can dene the marginal e¤ect of raising toughness from the status
quo t:
 The (marginal) e¤ect (of toughness) is dened as E := x0(t), the derivative
(at the status quo) of damage with respect to toughness.15
How can we meaningfully decompose E into two sube¤ects? As illustrated
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Figure 9: The old, the new, and the two hypothetical damage levels
in Figure 9, the key is to rst introduce two hypothetical behaviours, one that
neglects provocation and one that neglects deterrence:
 The pure-deterrence or provocation-neglecting response to policy t 2 T ,
denoted (xdeter(t); ydeter(t)), is dened as (x(t; t); y(t; t)), the choice that
14Throughout, the derivative of a function at a point on the boundary of the functions
domain is interpreted as usual, i.e. as a one-sided derivative.
15R3 ensures that x(t) (and xdeter(t) and xprov(t) dened below) are indeed di¤erentiable
functions. See the proof of Theorem 1.
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maximises the old preference t within the new feasible set Ft. It cap-
tures deterrence without provocation, as it represents how the individual
would react to the new policy if (hypothetically) his preferences were to re-
main unchanged. It represents how a provocation-neglecting policy maker
predicts the individuals response to policy t.
 The pure-provocation or deterrence-neglecting response to policy t 2 T ,
denoted (xprov(t); yprov(t)), is dened as (x(t; t); y(t; t)), the choice that
maximises the new preference t within the old feasible set Ft. It cap-
tures provocation without deterrence, by representing how the individual
would react to the new policy t if (hypothetically) he did not yet face the
new constraints (such as new punishment levels). Under another interpre-
tation, it represents the individuals reaction if, although his preferences
are already a¤ected (perhaps provoked) by the new environment, he is
short-sighted or irrational in that he ignores the new punishment levels
he faces.
The pure-deterrence damage xdeter(t) and pure-provocation damage xprov(t)
represent two partial views on the persons damage response to policy t: xdeter(t)
is optimal under old preferences given new punishment levels, and xprov(t) is
optimal under new preferences supposing old punishment levels. I can now
dene deterrence and provocation e¤ects.
 The (marginal) deterrence e¤ect (of toughness) is dened asDE := x0deter(t),
the derivative (taken at the status quo t = t) of the pure-deterrence dam-
age xdeter(t). It captures the marginal damage change as far as it is caused
by changing constraints (punishments), ignoring any meanwhile prefer-
ences change.
 The (marginal) provocation e¤ect (of toughness) is dened as PE :=
x0prov(t), the derivative (taken at the status quo t = t) of the pure-
provocation damage xprov(t). It captures the marginal damage change
as far it is caused by preference change, ignoring the changing constraints
(punishments).
3.3 Theorem
I now show that the total e¤ect of toughness is decomposable into E = PE+DE
with PE  0 and DE  0. While the additive decomposition E = PE +DE
is simple to prove (essentially, by applying the chain rule), the claim on the
signs of the sube¤ects is non-trivial and does not hold universally, but under
meaningful conditions. Specically, each inequality, PE  0 and DE  0,
is based on exactly one condition on preferences. The condition for PE  0
excludes that raising toughness appeases the preference; more precisely:
Condition NIP (no inverse provocability) If the individual is currently in-
di¤erent between two damage-punishment pairs, then a toughness raise cannot
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make him prefer the pair with lower damage. That is, whenever (x; y) t (x0; y0)
with x < x0, then no policy t 2 T with t > t leads to (x; y) t (x0; y0).
NIP is plausible it is less demanding than requiring that t be at least as
brutal as t (see Section 2.1) whenever t > t but not universal: surely, there
also exist inversely provocable individuals, such as ones who after the traumatic
experience of a war lose any desire to exercise violence themselves. For such
individuals, the provocation e¤ect PE can become negative.
As the deterrence e¤ect DE is (unlike PE) dened by holding preferences
xed, the inequality DE  0 has to be based on a condition quite di¤erent to
NIP: not a condition about how preference changes as the policy changes, but
one about internal consistency of status quo preference:
Condition TC (translation-consistency) Under the status quo preferences, a
preference of one damage-punishment pair over another with lower punishment
is not reversed by any symmetric punishment increase. That is, whenever
(x; y) t (x0; y0) with y > y0, then for no  > 0 there is (x; y + ) t (x0; y0 + ).
By TC, an extra amount of punishment cannot hurt less if the person al-
ready su¤ers more punishment; for instance, an extra hour of compulsory labour
cannot hurt less if it comes on top of 10 hours than if it comes on top of 5 hours.
TC is again plausible but not universal, and its failure can render the deterrence
e¤ect DE positive.
Unlike the denition of PE, that of DE is based on varying the feasible set
Ft, and so the sign of DE cannot possibly be independent of how Ft reacts to
the policy t 2 T . This is why the inequality DE  0 requires an extra condition
on feasible sets, one that relates the shape of Ft to the toughness level t 2 T .
Specically, I require that the tougher the policy t 2 T is, the steeper the
feasible set Ft becomes, i.e. the larger marginal punishment becomes:
Condition MP (marginal punishment increases with toughness) Each feasible
set Ft, t 2 T , contains the no-damage-no-punishment pair (0; 0), it is (topologi-
cally) closed and connected, and its marginal punishment function f 0t : Xt ! R
is dened16, non-negative, and (at least weakly) increasing in toughness t17.
Essentially, MP requires the southern border of the feasible set Ft (i.e. the
graph of ft) to have a non-negative slope that increases if toughness t increases.
In the special case that each feasible set Ft is thin(i.e. identical to its south-
ern border: Ft = f(x; ft(x)) : x 2 Xtg), MP simply requires feasible sets to
everywhere have a non-negative slope that increases with toughness. MP holds
for instance if T = (0;1) and each Ft has southern border of
16That is, the punishment function ft : Xt ! R+ is di¤erentiable.
17That is, t < t0 implies that f 0t(x)  f 0t0(x) at all damage levels x  0, with f 0t(x) (resp.
f 0t0(x)) naturally read as 1 if x is infeasible, i.e. if x =2 Xt (resp. x =2 Xt0):
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 the linear form ft(x) = tx (so f 0t(x) = t), or more generally,
 the form ft(x) = txc for a xed c > 0 (so f 0t(x) = ctxc 1),
because f 0t is then non-negative and increasing in t.
Theorem 1 Consider the unidimensional policy choice problem UP. Then, for
every individual whose preferences are regular (i.e. satisfy R1-R3),
(a) the e¤ect of toughness on terrorism is the sum of the deterrence and provo-
cation e¤ects: E = PE +DE;
(b) the two sube¤ects are competing, that is:
 PE  0 if individual preferences satisfy NIP;
 DE  0 if individual preferences satisfy TC and policies satisfy MP.
This theorem (proved in Appendix B) conrms Section 2s analysis of a
trade-o¤ between deterrence and provocation, this time from a marginal tough-
ness angle, i.e. from a comparative statics angle. Indeed, under Theorem 1s
conditions the two sube¤ects pull in opposite directions, and whether a mar-
ginal toughness rise increases terrorism by the person depends on which of PE
and DE dominates. Arguably, this comparison is what policy makers should
mainly focus on in practice.
Of course, Theorem 1 implies an analogous decomposition at the aggregate
level: E = PE + DE, with E, PE, and PE dened as the sum-total of the
individual e¤ects E; PE and DE across the population, respectively.
3.4 The social utility of toughness
So far I have been largely informal about the policy makers preferences, occa-
sionally assuming that he minimises sum-total terrorism or sum-total terrorism
plus policy costs. More generally, assume now he holds some arbitrary prefer-
ence order over the set RN+T of damages-policy combinations ((xi)i2N ; t), and
let this preference be representable by a social utilityfunction U : RN+T ! R
such that
 (terrorism-aversion) U is an (at least weakly) decreasing function of each
individual is damage level xi 2 R+.
There are numerous examples. Social utility may be dened by U((xi)i2N ; t) =
 
X
i2N
xi if the policy maker minimises sum-total terrorism, or by U((xi)i2N ; t) =
#fi 2 N : xi = 0g if he minimises the number of terrorists (individuals with
positive damage). A more general specication is U((xi)i2N ; t) =  
X
i2N
xi
(with a xed parameter  > 0), which reduces to the rst example if a = 1
and to the second one if  ! 0. Another natural class of utility functions are
the Cobb-Douglas forms U((xi)i2N ; t) = i2Nxi (for some parameter  > 0).
Each of these specications can be rened by subtracting a (suitably scaled)
cost term Cost(t) that captures nancial costs or other negative policy e¤ects
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such as loss of (civilian or military) lives or loss of life quality through more
state supervision; this gives for instance the utility specication U((xi)i2N ; t) =
 
X
i2N
xi   Cost(t). Note that by subtracting a cost term we assume that
policy costs are additively separable from the damage disutility. A specication
without additive separability is U((xi)i2N ; t) = t i2Nxi (for xed parameters
;  > 0), assuming here that t is a toughness level taken from a policy interval
T  (0;1) and that toughness is costly (i.e.  > 0).
We now proceed to a comparative statics analysis that makes the follow-
ing assumptions. As in the last two subsections, we consider the unidimen-
sional policy choice problem UP, and assume that individual preferences on the
damage-punishment quadrant R2+ are regular (i.e. satisfy R1-R3), so that each
individual i has to any toughness level t 2 T a unique optimal damage response
xi(t), which is di¤erentiable in t. Further, let the utility function U be di¤er-
entiable. Then the marginal value of toughness t can be captured by the total
derivative dU=dt (evaluated at the status quo t). By the chain rule,
dU
dt|{z}
marginal
utility of
toughness
=
X
i2N
@U
@xi|{z}
0
marginal
utility of is
damage
dxi
dt|{z}
0 or 0
individual
damage
response
+
@U
@t|{z}
0
cost
e¤ect
. (2)
So the marginal utility of toughness is composed of a (direct) cost e¤ect @U
@t
and (indirect) e¤ects @U
@xi
dxi
dt
(i 2 N) through peoples responses. While the cost
e¤ect is typically negative because toughness is expensive, the indirect e¤ects
can go in either direction because the sign of the damage response dxi
dt
may di¤er
across individuals i. Using Theorem 1, we can decompose the damage response
into the sum dxi
dt
= DEi+PEi of the deterrence e¤ect DEi and the provocation
e¤ect PEi on individual is damage, where typically DEi  0 and PEi  0. So,
(2) becomes
dU
dt|{z}
marginal
utility of
toughness
=
X
i2N
@U
@xi
DEi| {z }
0
aggregate deterrence
e¤ect on utility
+
X
i2N
@U
@xi
PEi| {z }
0
aggregate provocation
e¤ect on utility
+
@U
@t|{z}
0
cost
e¤ect
. (3)
Three competing forces thus act on the marginal utility of toughness: dU
dt
is
increased by an aggregate deterrence term, but decreased both by an aggregate
provocation term and the cost e¤ect. Whether a toughness increase is desirable
depends on whether the deterrence term overweighs the two other terms.
Suppose further the policy maker does not care about who creates damage,
in the sense that U((xi)i2N ; t) = U((x0i)i2N ; t) whenever the damage proles
(xi)i2N and (x0i)i2N display identical total damage
X
i2N
xi =
X
i2N
x0i. As
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one easily shows, the partial derivative @U
@xi
is then the same for each individual
i; so it can be bracketed out in (3), and we obtain
dU
dt|{z}
marginal
utility of
toughness
=
@U
@xi|{z}
0
marginal
utility of
terrorism
( DE|{z}
0
aggregate
deterrence
e¤ect
+ PE|{z}
0
aggregate
provocation
e¤ect
) +
@U
@t|{z}
0
cost
e¤ect
; (4)
where DE and PE are, as usual, the aggregate deterrence e¤ect
X
i2N
DEi
resp. provocation e¤ect
X
i2N
PEi. Whether raising toughness is benecial
depends on the sign of (4). It is benecial if (4) is positive, which (assuming
that @U
@xi
is strictly negative) happens exactly when
DE|{z}
0
+ PE|{z}
0
<   @U=@t
@U=@xi| {z }
0
; (5)
i.e. when the two competing e¤ects, DE and PE, are overall su¢ ciently neg-
ative. By contrast, a provocation-neglecting policy maker (who believes that
preferences are policy-invariant, hence that PE = 0) raises toughness already if
DE <   @U=@t
@U=@xi
; (6)
hence more easily because PE  0. The criteria (5) and (6) illustrate the be-
havioural di¤erence between accounting for and neglecting provocation: in his
decision over whether to raise toughness, the provocation-aware policy maker
is guided by the more restrictive criterion (5), hence raises toughness less eas-
ily and reduces toughness more easily. The equilibrium toughness level (at
which the policy maker neither raise nor reduces toughness) is lower for the
provocation-aware policy maker, because his rst-order condition
DE+PE =   @U=@t
@U=@xi
(7)
is typically satised at a lower status quo toughness than the provocation-
neglecting policy makers rst-order condition
DE =   @U=@t
@U=@xi
: (8)
The di¤erent equilibrium conditions (7) and (8) again illustrate the di¤er-
ent toughness dispositions underlying provocation-aware and -neglecting policy
making.
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4 Concluding remarks
First, let me summarise informally some points that have been developed for-
mally. A policy maker may try to reduce terrorism either by cause-related
measures, which aim to appease peoples preferences, or by symptom-related
measures, which change the constraints (feasible set) under which terrorists
maximise their preference and which, importantly, may have side e¤ects on
some peoples preference (provocation). While both approaches are costly,
a fundamental di¤erence lies in the benet side: cause-related measures re-
duce terrorism (the only question being: by how much?), whereas symptom-
related measures may or may not reduce terrorism, depending on whether the
deterrence e¤ect overweighs the provocation e¤ect. This does not imply that
symptom-related measures are generally inferior, but that they bear a higher
downside-risk: the worst outcome of a cause-related measure is to incur the
policy cost without terrorism reduction, but the worst outcome of a symptom-
related measure (e.g. a war) is to incur the policy cost with a terrorism in-
crease. Most of the paper has focussed on analysing symptom-related policies,
and specically the trade-o¤ between deterrence and provocation. Theorem 1
provides general su¢ cient conditions under which the marginal deterrence e¤ect
is non-positive (i.e. terrorism-reducing) and the marginal provocation e¤ect is
non-negative (i.e. terrorism-increasing). I have argued that it is easy in prac-
tice to overlook provocation e¤ects (Section 2.5). Provocation-neglect leads to
toughness exaggeration (the fallacy of neglecting provocation), as argued in-
formally in Section 2.5 and shown formally in Section 3.4 by comparing the
(rst-order) conditions under which a provocation-aware and a provocation-
neglecting policy maker chooses how tough to be. As an analytic example,
Theorem 2 in Appendix A characterises optimal policies for a stylised objective
function (minimising the number of terrorists), again conrming that there is a
trade-o¤ between deterring and provoking, and that provocation-neglect leads
to toughness exaggeration.
Our analysis poses several empirical and theoretical challenges. On the em-
pirical side, it would be of high practical interest to know the extent to which
concrete cause-related policies (investments into social stability, into education
etc.) appease preferences,18 and the extent to which concrete symptom-related
policies (weapons embargoes, military presence, criminal legislation etc.) bru-
talise preferences, i.e. provoke. Among di¤erent ways to deter (i.e. to render
the feasible set F  R2+ steeper), which ones provoke least? Are there policies
that deter without provoking? A concrete hypothesis to investigate is whether
defensive deterrence provokes less than aggressive deterrence. As mentioned
in Section 2.2, I count a deterrence measure as defensive if it makes it harder
to create terrorism (e.g. weapons embargoes) and as aggressive if it increases
18This question relates to existing empirical research apart from the di¤erence between
appeasing preferences and reducing terrorism.
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punishment (e.g. tough criminal legislation).19 To provide answers to such ques-
tions, it would help to understand whether and when provocability is a form of
reciprocity, or of taste acquisition, or of dynamic inconsistency, a psychological
question (see Section 2.4).
On a theoretical dimension, there is plenty of room for adapting our model
to concrete applications, or for merging it with models studied in political
economy (that is, incorporating provocation into these models), or for ren-
ing the strategic interaction between individuals and the policy maker. For
instance, one might introduce uncertainty of the policy maker about the types
of population members, i.e., about how brutal and how provocable their pref-
erences are. Or, one might model a repeated interaction between policy maker
and population, with the question arising as to whether toughness can provoke
only in the short run or can have lasting provocation e¤ects on the population.
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A An example: minimising the number of ter-
rorists
Unlike in much of this paper, policies may now contain both cause- and symptom-
related measures; they might be represented as vectors t = (t1; :::; tk) of positions
on k cause- or symptom-related dimensions. While I have so far ensured high
generality of preferences by placing no specic restrictions (except from plau-
sible ones such as punishment-aversion of individuals and terrorism-aversion of
the policy maker), let us now turn to concrete preferences. I take the policy
maker to follow a paradigmatic and simple objective minimising the number
of terrorists and the individuals to hold preferences from a plausible but spe-
cial class. This will allow us to analytically determine optimal policies. The
upshot will be that optimal policies again have to strike the right compromise
between provocation and deterrence, albeit in a particular sense.
Specically, individual preferences fall into the following class.
Preference Model PM. Each individual in the population N is of one of the
following types.
Either he has a peaceful type, meaning that under each policy t 2 T his
preference order t (on R2+) is peaceful as dened Section 2.1. (The set of
peaceful types can be dened as the set of families (t)t2T of peaceful preference
orders.)
Or his type belongs to the set R of possibly brutal types. Each possibly
brutal type  in R ( represents the status quo damage-inclination) holds under
every policy t 2 T a preference order tt; that is punishment-averse (see
Section 2.1), strictly convex20, and representable by a utility function ut : R2+ !
R of the (separable) form
ut(x; y) = vt(x)  d(y) (for all x; y  0)
with the following interpretation and properties:
 d(y) represents disutility from punishment, where the function d : R+ !
R is policy-independent (a plausible restriction) and di¤erentiable.
 vt(x) represents utility of damage and takes the form vt(x) = v(x     
P (t)), where:
 v : R ! R is a di¤erentiable and strictly concave function that
peaks at 0; hence vt(x) peaks at x = +P (t), and so the type has a
brutal preference with preferred damage level +P (t) under policies
20That is, for every (x; y) 2 R2+ the upper contour set f(x0; y0) 2 R2+ : (x0; y0) t (x; y)g
is strictly convex. It follows that ut is quasi-concave (Th. A1.14 in Geo¤rey Jehle and
Philip Reny 2001; to be precise, this theorem uses a slightly stronger notion of strictly convex
preferences, which is implied by ours given that we also assume t to be continuous and
punishment-averse).
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t with  + P (t) > 0, and peaceful preferences under policies t with
 + P (t)  0.
P (t) 2 R is interpreted as the amount by which policy t provokes21,
i.e. increases the preferred damage level from the status quo t, and
accordingly I assume without loss of generality that P (t) = 0;22
  is interpreted as the status quo damage-inclination, as it is the
status quo preferred damage level (by P (t) = 0) provided   0.
 v, d and P (t) are the same across types  2 R (this is the main restriction,
essential for analytic tractability).
 There is no policy t 2 T at which all types  2 R most prefer the no-
damage-no-punishment pair (x; y) = (0; 0) from Ft (this excludes trivial
solutions to the problem of minimising the number of terrorists).
PM is a exible model: the precise forms of v; d; P; T can be chosen to
match the intended application. As as simple example, let the policy space be
unidimensional, say the interval T = R+ of toughness levels, let disutility of
punishment be linear, i.e. given by d(y) = by for a xed parameter b > 0, let
provocation be also linear, i.e. given by P (t) = (t t)p for a xed parameter p >
0 (recall that P (t) represents the change of preferred damage level if toughness
changes from the status quo level t to t), and let the function v be given by
v(x) :=  jxja for a xed parameter a > 2. In summary, then, under toughness
t 2 R+ type  2 R has the (quasi-linear) utility function
ut(x; y) =   jx     (t  t)pja   by for all (x; y) 2 R2+,
with preferred damage level given by +(t  t)p (or by 0 if this number is < 0).
While the policy space T is arbitrary (perhaps multi-dimensional with cause-
and symptom-related dimensions), a convexity property is required:
Convex Punishment CP. For each policy t 2 T , the feasible set Ft con-
tains the no-damage-no-punishment pair (0; 0), it is (topologically) closed and
connected, and its punishment function ft : Xt ! R+ is weakly convex.
Recall that ft(x) represents the minimal punishment for damage x 2 Xt;
the graph of ft is the southern border of the feasible set Ft. By CP, this
southern border has a weakly convex shape, for instance a linear shape given
by ft(x) = tx for some policy-dependent slope t  0. In general, as Ft is
connected and contains (0; 0), the feasible damage set Xt  R+ is an interval
containing 0, hence is either R+ (unlimited feasibility) or of the form [0; xt ] or
[0; xt ) (with a nite feasibility bound x

t ).
21The more general term a¤ects preferenceis perhaps better here than provokes, as t
could contain cause-related measures (aimed at preference appeasement, i.e. at P (t) < 0).
22One may always achieve P (t) = 0 by subtracting P (t) from each P (t), t 2 T , while
adding P (t) to each individuals type  2 R; this normalisation leaves individual preferences
unchanged.
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Theorem 2 Assuming the preference model PM and convex punishment CP,
(a) the expression D(t) := v0 1(d0(0)f 0t(0)) is for each policy t 2 T well-dened,
i.e. the (right hand) derivative f 0t(0) exists and d
0(0)f 0t(0) has a unique
inverse image under the derivative function v0 : R! R;
(b) (provocation-aware policies) each policy t 2 T that minimises P (t) +D(t)
minimises the number of terrorists if each individuals response to each
policy t 2 T maximises his preference within the feasible set Ft;
(c) (provocation-neglecting policies) each policy t 2 T that minimises D(t)
minimises the number of terrorists if each individuals response to each
policy t 2 T maximises his status quo preference within the feasible set
Ft;
(d) the individual responses assumed in (b) and (c) exist and are unique.
Taking the example given after the denition of PM and assuming each
toughness level t 2 T = R+ leads to the (maximal) feasible damage set Xt =
R+ and to a linear punishment function given by ft(x) = tx (which becomes
steeperif toughness t increases), one nds that D(t) =  (tb=a)1=(a 1), and by
minimising P (t) +D(t) = (t  t)p  (tb=a)1=(a 1) one nds the
optimal toughness level : t =
(b=a)1=(a 2)
(p(a  1))(a 1)=(a 2)
(as derived at the end of Appendix B). So optimal toughness increases if mar-
ginal provocation p = P 0(t) falls (i.e. if toughness provokes less), and also
if marginal punishment aversion b = d0(y) increases (i.e. if punishment hurts
more, hence deters more). These comparative statics conrm our intuition.
Theorem 2 once again conrms the trade-o¤ between provocation and de-
terrence: P (t) is a measure for how much the policy t provokes, and D(t) is
an (inverse) measure for how much t deters. D(t) measures deterrence in that
it reects the punishment function ft but not any policy-induced preference
change. D(t) measures deterrence inversely: the more deterring t, the steeper
the feasible set Ft, hence the higher the derivative f 0t(0), so the higher the prod-
uct d0(0)f 0t(0), and therefore, the lower D(t) = v
0 1(d0(0)f 0t(0)) because we have
applied a strictly decreasing function v0 1.23
Figure 10 illustrates the (one-dimensional) case that t is a toughness level
from a toughness interval T  R. Plausibly, the higher toughness t, the larger
P (t) (more provocation) and the smaller D(t) (more deterrence), the goal being
to minimise the sum P (t)+D(t). If T is multidimensional, the trade-o¤becomes
multi-dimensional, possibly with cause-related dimensions.
By contrast, the provocation-neglecting policy maker believes that P (t) =
0 (no provocation) for all (arbitrarily tough) policies t 2 T , hence what he
minimises is not P (t) +D(t) but D(t), leading to toughness exaggeration.
23v0 : R ! R is a strictly decreasing function, so has strictly decreasing inverse function
v0 1 : v(R)! R.
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0toughness t
P (t )  (provocation measure)
D (t )  (inverse deterrence measure)
P (t ) + D (t )  (minimandum)
toughness
with fewest
terrorists toughness
quostatus
t
Figure 10: The trade-o¤ in Theorem 2 for a unidimensional policy space T
Perhaps surprisingly, the optimal policies in Theorem 2 do not depend on the
distribution of types across the population: minimising P (t) +D(t) is optimal
regardless of how many individuals are highly damage-inclined (large  2 R).
So the policy maker can set its policy without understandingpeople. This in-
teresting feature of the model (with its stylised notion of optimality: minimising
the number of terrorists) is certainly an exception. In other models, optimal
policies are type-distribution-sensitive and often analytically intractable.
Finally, the provocation and deterrence measures P (t) and D(t) di¤er from
the earlier-studied provocation and deterrence e¤ects PE(t) andDE(t) because
they arise in the context of minimising the number of terrorists, not the sum-
total amount of terrorism as earlier.
B Proof of Theorems 1 and 2
Proof of Theorem 1. Suppose UP and R1-R3.
(a) By x(t) = x(t; t), the function t 7! x(t) is the composition of the dif-
ferentiable functions t 7! (t; t) (from T to T  T ) and the by R3 di¤erentiable
function (t1; t2) 7! x(t1; t2) (from T  T to R+). Hence, by the chain rule,
t 7! x(t) is itself di¤erentiable and
x0(t) =
@
@t1
x(t; t) +
@
@t2
x(t; t) at all t 2 T .
Setting t = t, the left-hand side becomesE, and the right-hand side is recognised
as the sum of PE and DE; for instance,
@
@t1
x(t; t) =
@
@t1
x(t; t)

t=t
=
d
dt
xprov(t)

t=t
= PE.
(b) Throughout, I write (x; y) for the pair (x(t; t); y(t; t)) (= (xprov(t); yprov(t)) =
(xdeter(t); ydeter(t))).
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1. In this part I assume NIP and show that PE  0. Suppose for a
contradiction that PE < 0. I establish several claims; the last one contains the
desired contradiction.
Claim 1. There exists a toughness level ~t 2 T larger than t such that
xprov(t) < x for all t 2 (t; ~t]. I write ~x := xprov(~t) and ~y := yprov(~t).
As PE = limt!t
xprov (t) xprov (t)
t t = limt!t
xprov (t) x
t t and as PE < 0, we have
xprov (t) x
t t < 0 for all t 6= t in a su¢ ciently small neighbourhood of t. In particular,
there is a ~t > t such that for all t 2 (t; ~t] we have xprov(t) x < 0, i.e. xprov(t) < x,
q.e.d.
Claim 2. For every damage level x 2 [~x; x] there exists a toughness level
t 2 [t; ~t] such that xprov(t) = x.
Let x 2 [~x; x]. As the function xprov is continuous on [t; ~t] (because it is
di¤erentiable) and as xprov(~t) = ~x  x  x = xprov(t), the intermediate value
theorem implies the existence of a t 2 [t; ~t] such that xprov(t) = x, q.e.d.
For every damage level x 2 [~x; x], dene
S(x) := supfy  0 : ut(x; y)  ut(~x; ~y)g ( 2 R+ [ f1; 1g),
with the usual conventions that sup ; :=  1 and that supQ := 1 whenever
Q  R has no upper bound.
Claim 3. S(~x) = ~y.
By denition of S(~x) we have S(~x)  ~y, and using punishment-aversion it
follows that S(~x) = ~y, q.e.d.
Claim 4. For all x 2 [~x; x], if S(x) 2 R+ then ut(x; S(x)) = ut(~x; ~y).
Consider any x 2 [~x; x] with S(x) 2 R+. To show that ut(x; S(x)) 
ut(~x; ~y), note that by denition of S(x) there is a sequence (yk)k=1;2;::: in [0; S(s)]
converging to S(x) such that ut(x; yk)  ut(~x; ~y) for all k = 1; 2; ::: As ut
is a continuous function, ut(x; yk) ! ut(x; S(x)) as k ! 1. So, as weak
inequalities are preserved in the limit, ut(x; S(x))  ut(~x; ~y). To show the
converse inequality, consider any sequence (zk)k=1;2;::: in (S(x);1) converging to
S(x) (of course there is one). By denition of S(x), we have ut(x; zk) < ut(~x; ~y)
for all k = 1; 2; ::: So, again by continuity of ut, ut(x; S(x))  ut(~x; ~y), q.e.d.
Claim 5. S(x) =1.
For a contradiction, suppose S(x) 6=1. We also have S(x) 6=  1 because
ut(x; y)  ut(~x; ~y) (as (x; y) maximises ut(x; y) subject to (x; y) 2 Ft). So
S(x) 2 R+. Hence, by Claim 4,
(*) ut(x; S(x)) = ut(~x; ~y).
This and the inequality ut(x; y) > ut(~x; ~y) (which holds because (x; y)
uniquely maximises ut(x; y) subject to (x; y) 2 Ft) imply that ut(x; y) >
ut(x; S(x)), which by punishment-aversion entails that
(**) y < S(x).
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But (*) also implies that u~t(~x; ~y)  u~t(x; S(x)) by NIP. Using (**) and
punishment-aversion, it follows that u~t(~x; ~y) < u~t(x; y), a contradiction since
(~x; ~y) maximises u~t(x; y) subject to (x; y) 2 Ft, q.e.d.
Claim 6. There exists an x 2 [~x; x] that is smallest subject to S(x) =1. I
denote it by x1.
I have to show that the set X1 := fx 2 [~x; x] : S(x) = 1g has a smallest
element. By Claim 5, X1 is non-empty. So it has an inmum x := infX1 in
[~x; x]. I have to show that S(x) = 1 (i.e. that the inmum is a minimum).
By denition of x, there is a sequence (xk)k=1;2;::: in X1 that converges to x.
Consider any y  0. As ut is a continuous function, ut(xk; y) ! ut(x; y) as
k ! 1. Note also that, for all k, ut(xk; y)  ut(~x; ~y): otherwise ut(xk; y0) <
ut(~x; ~y) for all y0 > y by punishment-aversion, implying that S(xk)  y, in
contradiction with xk 2 X1. So, as weak inequalities are preserved in the limit,
we have ut(x; y)  ut(~x; ~y). Since this has been shown for all y  0, we have
S(x) =1, q.e.d.
Claim 7. x1 > ~x.
By Claim 3, S(~x) = ~y. So S(~x) <1. Hence x1 6= ~x by Claim 6, q.e.d.
Claim 8. S(x)!1 as x " x1.
Consider any sequence (xk)k=1;2;::: in [~x; x1) such that xk " x1. I have
to show that S(xk) ! 1. For a contradiction, suppose that S(xk) 6! 1.
Then there is a y^ > 0 and a subsequence (xkj)j=1;2;::: I denote it simply by
(x0j)j=1;2;::: such that S(x
0
j) < y^ for all j. So, by denition of S(x
0
j), we have
ut(x
0
j; y^) < ut(~x; ~y) for all j. Hence, as ut(x
0
j; y^)! ut(x1; y^) by continuity of ut
and as weak inequalities are preserved in the limit, we have ut(x1; y^)  ut(~x; ~y).
Hence, by punishment-aversion, we have ut(x1; y) < ut(~x; ~y) for all y > y^.
So S(x1)  y^, a contradiction since S(x1) =1 by Claim 6, q.e.d.
Claim 9. For all y  0, we have u~t(x1; y)  u~t(~x; ~y).
Let y  0. By Claim 8 there is an x0 2 [~x; x1) such that S(x)  y for all
x 2 (x0; x1). For any x 2 (x0; x1), we have
 u~t(x; y)  u~t(x; S(x)) by punishment-aversion, and
 u~t(x; S(x))  u~t(~x; ~y) by NIP and the fact that ut(x; S(x)) = ut(~x; ~y)
given Claim 4.
So u~t(x; y)  u~t(~x; ~y) for all x 2 (x0; x1). Hence, as u~t is continuous,
u~t(x1; y)  u~t(~x; ~y), q.e.d.
Claim 10. (~x; ~y) does not maximise u~t(x; y) subject to (x; y) 2 Ft (a con-
tradiction, completing the proof).
By Claim 2 there is a toughness level t 2 [t; ~t] such that xprov(t) = x1. Write
y1 := yprov(t). I now apply Claim 9 to y1+1, which gives us u~t(x1; y1+1) 
u~t(~x; ~y). So, u~t(x1; y1) > u~t(~x; ~y) by punishment-aversion. As (x1; y1) =
(xprov(t); yprov(t)) 2 Ft, it follows that (~x; ~y) does not maximise u~t(x; y) subject
to (x; y) 2 Ft, q.e.d.
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2. I now assume TC and MP, and show thatDE  0. Suppose thatDE > 0.
I derive a contradiction, again in several steps.
Claim 1. The feasible damage sets Xt  R+, t 2 T , are intervals containing
0, and the function t 7! Xt is weakly decreasing (w.r.t. set-inclusion).
Each Xt is an interval containing 0 because it is the projection on the x-
coordinate of the set Ft  R2+, which by MP is connected and contains (0; 0).
Now consider t < t0 in T . To show that Xt0  Xt, let x 2 Xt0. By the
increasingness assumption in MP, f 0t(x)  f 0t0(x); so f 0t(x) < 1, and hence
x 2 Xt0, q.e.d.
Claim 2. There exists a toughness level ~t 2 T larger than t such that
xdeter(~t) > x. I henceforth write ~x for xdeter(~t).
By assumptionDE = x0deter(t) > 0, i.e. limt!t
xdeter (t) xdeter (t)
t t = limt!t
xdeter (t) x
t t >
0. So xdeter (t) x
t t > 0 for all t 6= t su¢ ciently close t. Hence xdeter(t)   x > 0 for
all t > t su¢ ciently close t, q.e.d.
Claim 3. ft(x) is (at least weakly) increasing in each argument, i.e. in
x 2 Xt (for each t 2 T ) and in t 2 ft0 2 T : x 2 Xt0g (for each x  0).
At any xed t 2 T , increasingness in x 2 Xt holds since, by MP, f 0t(x)  0
at all x 2 Xt. To show increasingness in t 2 T , consider a xed x^  0, and
let t ; t+ 2 ft 2 T : x^ 2 Xtg satisfy t   t+. To show that ft (x^)  ft+(x^),
I dene the function g : [0; x^] ! R by g(x) := ft+(x)   ft (x) and show that
g(x^)  0. This follows from two facts:
 g(x^)  g(0), by the following argument. At every x 2 [0; x^], g has a
non-negative derivative g0(x)  0 because t+  t  and because f 0t(x) is
by MP increasing in t 2 T . So g is increasing, implying that g(x^)  g(0).
 g(0) = 0, by the following argument. For all t 2 T we have ft(0) = 0
because (0; 0) 2 Ft by MP. So g(0) = ft+(0)  ft (0) = 0  0 = 0, q.e.d.
Claim 4. For all t 2 T , ydeter(t) = ft(xdeter(t)) (so I may henceforth write
ft(x) for ydeter(t), and f~t(~x) for ydeter(~t)).
Let t 2 T . As Ft is topologically closed, it contains (xdeter(t); ft(xdeter(t)))
(by denition of ft), i.e. (xdeter(t); ft(xdeter(t))) is a feasible choice. So ydeter(t)
cannot be larger than ft(xdeter(t)) (otherwise (xdeter(t); ydeter(t)) would be dis-
preferred to (xdeter(t); ft(xdeter(t))) by punishment-aversion); it also cannot it be
smaller than ft(xdeter(t)) (otherwise (xdeter(t); ydeter(t)) would be infeasible by
denition of ft), q.e.d.
Claim 5. x; ~x 2 X~t  Xt and f~t(~x)  f~t(x)  ft(~x)  ft(x)  0.
By denition, ~x 2 X~t. Also x 2 X~t, as 0  x < ~x and as X~t is an interval
containing 0 (by Claim 1) and containing ~x. By Claim 1, X~t  Xt. As for the
inequalities, the second one holds because ~x > x and because ft(x) is increasing
in x 2 Xt by Claim 3. I now show the rst inequality. For every x 2 X~t, since
f 0t(x) is by MP increasing in t 2 T , and since ~t > t, we have f 0~t(x)  f 0t(x),
i.e. d
dx
(f~t(x)   ft(x))  0. So f~t(x)   ft(x) is a weakly increasing function of
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x 2 X~t. Hence, as ~x > x, we have f~t(~x) ft(~x)  f~t(x) ft(x), or by reordering,
f~t(~x)  f~t(x)  ft(~x)  ft(x), q.e.d.
Claim 6. There is a counterexample to the condition TC.
I consider any  > 0 and show that TC is violated when applied to the pairs
(x; ft(x)) and (~x; ft(~x) + ) and to the punishment shift := f~t(x)  ft(x). To
see that TC is applicable here, note three things.
 The rst of the two pairs has lower punishment because ft(x)  ft(~x) <
ft(~x) + , where the rst inequality follows from Claim 5.
 The rst pair is preferred to the second pair because (x; ft(x)) t (~x; ft(~x)) t
(~x; ft(~x) + ), where the second preference holds by punishment-aversion,
and the rst by the fact that (x; ft(x)) uniquely maximises t within Ft.
   0 because ~t > t and because ft(x) is by Claim 3 increasing in t. (To
be precise, the condition TC is originally stated with a strict inequality
 > 0, but the condition trivially holds also if  = 0.)
Now, by TC, (x; ft(x) + ) t (~x; ft(~x) +  + ). So, as  = f~t(x)  ft(x),
(x; f~t(x)) t (~x; ft(~x) + f~t(x)  ft(x) + ).
In this, the right-hand side is weakly preferred to (~x; f~t(~x)+ ), by punishment-
aversion as by Claim 5 ft(~x) + f~t(x)  ft(x) +   f~t(~x) + . So
(x; f~t(x)) t (~x; f~t(~x) + ).
Since we have shown this for every  > 0, and since by the continuity of t any
weak preference is preserved in the limit, we deduce that
(x; f~t(x)) t lim
#0
(~x; f~t(~x) + ) = (~x; f~t(~x)),
a contradiction because (~x; f~t(~x)) uniquely maximises ~t within F~t and because
(x; f~t(x)) 2 F~t (by denition of f~t and the topological closedness of F~t). 
Proof of Theorem 2. Assume PM and CP. A close look at part (c) reveals
that it follows from part (b) by taking the case that P (t) = 0 for all t 2 T (no
policy provokes); similarly, in (d), the claim referring to (c) follows from that
referring to (b) by taking the mentioned special case. The proof of (a), (b) and
the relevant part of (d) is done in several claims; (a) follows from Claims 2 and
9, (b) from Claim 10, and the relevant part of (d) from Claim 5.
Claim 1. For every policy t 2 T , the feasible damage set Xt  R+ is a non-
singleton interval containing 0, and the ratio ft(x)=x is an increasing function
of x 2 Xtnf0g.
Let t 2 T . As Ft is by CP connected and contains (0; 0), Xt is an interval
containing 0. Xt is non-singleton: otherwise Ft = f(0; 0)g, so that (0; 0) would
be each types best response to policy t, a trivial case excluded in PM. Now let
x; x0 2 Xtnf0g with x < x0. The x can be written as x0 for some 0 <  < 1.
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So, as ft is by CP convex, f(x)  f(x0) + (1   )f(0) = f(x0), whence
f(x)=x  f(x0)=x = f(x0)=x0, q.e.d.
Claim 2. For every policy t 2 T , the function ft : Xt ! R+ is increasing,
continuous, and di¤erentiable (from the right) at x = 0 with f 0t(0)  0.
Let t 2 T . The function ft is increasing on Xtnf0g by Claim 1, hence
increasing on its full domain as ft(0) = 0 by (0; 0) 2 Ft. As x # 0, the ratio
f(x) f(0)
x 0 = f(x)=x is decreasing (by Claim 1) and bounded below by 0, hence
has a limit f 0(0) that is moreover  0. It remains to show continuity. Since
ft is convex, it is continuous on every open subinterval I  Xt (as the reader
can easily check); so the only potential discontinuities arise at the boundaries of
Xt. Continuity at the left boundary 0 holds by di¤erentiability. Now suppose
Xt contains a right boundary, i.e. takes the form Xt = [0; x]. and consider
an increasing sequence (xk)k=1;2;::: in Xt with xk " x. As ft is increasing, the
sequence (ft(xk))k=1;2;::: is increasing and bounded (by ft(x)), hence converges
to a value y. So (xk; ft(xk))k=1;2;::: is a sequence in Ft that converges to (a; y).
So, as Ft is topologically closed, we have (a; y) 2 Ft, hence f(a) = y, q.e.d.
Claim 3. The function d : R+ ! R is strictly increasing.
This follows easily from punishment-aversion, q.e.d.
Claim 4. For every policy t 2 T , if Xt = [0; a) for some a  at 2 R+, then
ft(x)!1 as x " a, and for every type  there exists an    2 (0; a) such
that (x; ft(x)) t; (0; 0) for all x 2 (a   ; a).
Let t 2 T and Xt = [0; a) with a 2 R+.
First, if we had ft(x) 6! 1 as x " a, there would exist a sequence (xk)k=1;2;:::
in Xt with xk ! a such that the sequence (xk; ft(xk))k=1;2;::: is bounded in R2+;
now taking any convergent subsequence of it (there is one; see Th. A1.8 in Geof-
frey Jehle and Philip Reny 2001), we would have a sequence in Ft that converges
to some point (a; y) outside Ft, a contradiction since Ft is topologically closed.
Second, consider any type . The claim is obvious if  is a peaceful type.
Now suppose  2 R and for a contradiction let no  > 0 have the required
property. Then there exists a sequence (xk)k=1;2;::: in Xt such that xk ! a and
(xk; ft(xk)) t; (0; 0) for all k = 1; 2; ::: By ft(xk)!1 and xk ! a, we have
k := ft(xk)=xk ! 1 as k ! 1. In other words, the slope k of the straight
line from (0; 0) to (xk; ft(xk)) tends to 1 as k !1. The point (1=k; 1) is on
this line; so, as (xk; ft(xk)) t; (0; 0) and as preference t; is convex, we have
(1=k; 1) t; (0; 0) for all k = 1; 2; ::: It follows that (0; 1) t; (0; 0), using that
(1=k; 1)! (0; 1) and that weak preferences are preserved in the limit because
t; is continuous (by the continuity of ut; : R2+ ! R). This is a contradiction,
because punishment-aversion requires that (0; 1) t; (0; 0), q.e.d.
Claim 5. Each type  has a unique optimal response to each t 2 T , denoted
(xt ; y

t ); this optimum satises y

t = ft(x

t ), and it is (0; 0) if  is a peaceful type
or a type in R with  + P (t)  0.
Consider a t 2 T . If a type has an optimum (x; y) 2 Ft then it must
35
be that y = ft(x), by punishment-aversion and since Ft contains (x; ft(x)) by
topological closedness (see CP).
All peaceful types  and also all types  2 R with  + P (t)  0 have
peaceful (and punishment-averse) preferences t;, hence have the no-damage-
no-punishment pair (0; 0) as their unique optimal response to t.
It remains to consider a type  2 R with  + P (t) > 0.
To show uniqueness, suppose for a contradiction that (x1; ft(x1)) and (x2; ft(x2))
are two distinct optimal responses to t. Consider any x strictly between x1 and
x2, say x = x1 + (1   )x2 where  2 (0; 1). The response (x; ft(x)) is of
course feasible (i.e. in Ft); I show that it is strictly preferred to (x1; ft(x1)),
a contradiction. Let y := ft(x1) + (1   )ft(x2). As ft is convex, y 
ft(x
), and so by punishment-aversion, (*) (x; ft(x)) t; (x; y). More-
over, by (x; y) = (x1; ft(x1)) + (1   )(x2; ft(x2)), the strict convexity of
t; implies that (x; y + ) t; (x1; ft(x1)) for some  > 0, and hence that
(x; y) t; (x1; ft(x1)) by punishment-aversion. The latter and (*) imply that
(x; ft(x)) t; (x1; ft(x1)), the desired contradiction.
To show existence, I distinguish three cases.
Case 1 : Xt is bounded and closed, i.e. of the compact form Xt = [0; xt ].
As ft is continuous (by Claim 2) and ut; is also continuous, ut;(x; ft(x)) is
a continuous function of x 2 Xt, hence (as Xt is compact) admits a global
maximum ~x 2 Xt by WeierstrassTheorem (Carl Simon and Lawrence Blume
1994, Th. 30.1). Now (~x; ft(~x)) maximises ut;(x; y) subject to (x; y) 2 Ft, as
desired.
Case 2 : Xt is bounded and open, i.e. of the form Xt = [0; xt ). By Claim 4,
Xt has a subinterval of the form [0; xt   ] such that all feasible pairs (x; ft(x))
with x =2 [0; xt   ] are strictly dispreferred to some feasible pair (x; ft(x)) with
x 2 [0; xt   ] (in fact, strictly dispreferred to (0; 0)). So it su¢ ces to show that
the function ut;(x; ft(x)) of x admits a maximum on the compact subinterval
[0; xt   ]  Xt. This can be done analogously to the proof in case 1.
Case 3 : Xt is unbounded, i.e. Xt = R+. By an argument analogous to that
in case 1, on the compact subinterval [0;  + P (t)] the function ut;(x; ft(x)) of
x admits a maximum ~x 2 [0;  + P (t)]. I show that ~x is a global maximum of
ut;(x; ft(x)), which completes the proof as it establishes that (~x; ft(~x)) is an
optimal within Ft. To do so, consider any x 2 R+ larger than  + P (t). Recall
that
ut;(x; ft(x)) = v(x     P (t))  d(ft(x)).
So, as v(x  P (t))  v(0) (because v peaks at 0) and d(ft(x))  d(ft(+P (t)))
(because ft and d are increasing functions by Claims 2 and 3),
ut;(x; ft(x))  v(0)  d(ft( + P (t))) = ut;( + P (t)); ft( + P (t))),
which is at most ut;(~x; ft(~x)) by the restricted maximality property of ~x. This
shows the global maximality property of ~x, q.e.d.
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Claim 6. The derivative v0 : R! R is strictly decreasing and v0(0) = 0.
This holds because v is strictly concave and peaks at x = 0.
Claim 7. The range v0(R) of v0 is an interval containing 0.
By the previous claim, 0 = v0(0) 2 v0(R). To prove that v0(R) is an interval
(which if v0 is continuous follows easily from the intermediate value theorem),
it su¢ ces to show that, for all x1; x2 2 v0(R) with x1 < x2 and all s between
v0(x1) and v0(x2) there exists an ~x 2 [x1; x2] such that v0(~x) = s. Consider such
x1; x2; s. By the previous claim, v0(x2) < v0(x1), and hence v0(x2) < s < v0(x1).
I distinguish two cases, and write k for the coe¢ cient v(x2) v(x1)
x2 x1 .
Case 1 : s  k. The (di¤erentiable) function g(x) := v(x) [v(x1)+s(x x1)]
of x 2 R satises
g0(x1) = v0(x1)  s > 0.
So, as g(x1) = 0, we have g(x) > 0 for some x 2 (x1; x2). Moreover,
g(x2) = v(x2)  v(x1)  s(x2   x1)
 v(x2)  v(x1)  k(x2   x1) = 0
By g(x) > 0 and g(x2)  0, and since g is continuous, the intermediate value
theorem implies the existence of some ~x 2 (x; x2] such that g(~x) = 0. This
means that v(~x) = v(x1)+ s(~x x1), i.e. that v(~x) v(x1)~x x1 = s. Now we can apply
the mean value theorem to the di¤erentiable function v, which guarantees the
existence of an x 2 [x1; ~x] such that v0(x) = v(~x) v(x1)~x x1 = s, as desired.
Case 2 : s  k. An argument analogous to that in Case 1 (based now on
the function g(x) := v(x)  [v(x2) + s(x  x2)] of x 2 R) guarantees again the
existence of the desired ~x, q.e.d.
Claim 8. For all t 2 T and all  2 R, (i) the function Ut;(x) := ut;(x; ft(x))
of x 2 Xt is di¤erentiable (from the right) at x = 0 with U 0t;(0) = v0(   
P (t))  d0(0)f 0t(0), and (ii) xt > 0, U 0t;(0) > 0, v0(    P (t)) > d0(0)f 0t(0).
Let t 2 T and  2 R. Note that Ut;(x) = v(x      P (t))   d(ft(x))) for
all x 2 Xt. As ft is di¤erentiable (from the right) at x = 0 by Claim 1, and
as the functions v and d are di¤erentiable, the chain rule implies that Ut;(x) is
di¤erentiable (from the right) at x = 0 with derivative given by
U 0t;(0) = v
0(    P (t))  d0(ft(0))f 0t(0) = v0(    P (t))  d0(0)f 0t(0).
In (ii), the second equivalence is obvious by (i). Regarding the rst equiva-
lence, if U 0t;(0) > 0 then, for some x 2 Xt, we have Ut;(0) < Ut;(x), implying
that (0; 0) = (0; ft(0)) t; (x; ft(x)), hence that (0; 0) is not optimal, and so
xt; > 0. Conversely, suppose now that xt > 0. To show U
0
t;(0) > 0, I consider
two cases.
Case 1 : d0(0) = 0. Then U 0(0) = v0(    P (t)), which is positive because
    P (t) < 0 (by xt > 0 and Claim 5) and because v0 is positive on ( 1; 0)
(by Claim 7).
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Case 2 : d0(0) > 0. Since (xt ; ft(x

t )) = (x

t ; y

t ) is the unique optimal re-
sponse to t (by Claim 5), we have (xt ; y

t ) t; (0; ft(0)) = (0; 0). So, as the
preferencet; is continuity, there exists an  > 0 such that (xt ; yt+) t; (0; 0).
Hence, as t; is strictly convex, any strict convex combination of (xt ; yt + )
and (0; 0) is also strictly preferred to (0; 0). That is, (xt ; (y

t + )) t; (0; 0)
for all  2 (0; 1); or equivalently, (x; xyt+
xt
) t; (0; 0) for all x 2 (0; xt ). So the
function V : Xt ! R dened by V (x) = ut;

x; x
yt+
xt

satises V (x)  V (0)
whenever x < xt . As V is given by V (x) = v(x    P (t))  d

x
yt+
xt

and as
v and d are di¤erentiable, the chain rule implies that V is di¤erentiable with
derivative given by
V 0(x) = v0(x     P (t))  y

t + 
xt
d0(x
yt + 
xt
).
As V (x)  V (0) whenever x < xt , we have 0  V 0(0), i.e.
0  v0(    P (t))  y

t + 
xt
d0(0) < v0(    P (t))  y

t
xt
d0(0); (9)
where the latter inequality holds by d0(0) > 0. In the last expression,
yt
xt
=
ft(x

t )
xt
 lim
x#0
ft(x)
x
= f 0t(0)
by Claims 1 and 2. This inequality and (9) imply that 0 < v0(    P (t))  
d0(0)f 0t(0), i.e. that 0 < U
0(0), q.e.d.
Claim 9. For all t 2 T , d0(0)f 0t(0) has a unique inverse image v0 1(d0(0)f 0t(0))
under v0 (denoted D(t)).
Let t 2 T . Uniqueness of the inverse image holds because v0 is a strictly
decreasing (by Claim 6) and hence one-to-one. To show existence, I have to
show that d0(0)f 0t(0) is in the range v
0(R). By PM, there exists a type  2 R for
whom (x; y) = (0; 0) is not an optimal response to t; so the optimum (xt ; ft(x

t ))
satises xt > 0. Hence, by Claim 8, v
0(    P (t)) > d0(0)f 0t(0). As we also
have d0(0)f 0t(0)  0 (by Claims 1 and 2), d0(0)f 0t(0) 2 [0; v0(    P (t))] =
[v0(0); v0(  P (t))]. So, as [v0(0); v0(  P (t))]  v0(R) (because v0(R) is an
interval by Claim 7), d0(0)f 0t(0) 2 v0(R), q.e.d.
Claim 10. For all policies t 2 T , a type  2 R has xt > 0 (i.e. is a terrorist)
if and only  >  (P (t) +D(t)).
Let t 2 T and  2 R. We have xt > 0 if and only if v0(    P (t)) >
d0(0)f 0t(0). The function v
0 : R! R is by Claim 6 strictly decreasing, hence is
invertible with strictly decreasing inverse function v0 1, whose domain v(R) con-
tains both sides of the last inequality by Claim 9. So, applying v0 1 on both sides
of the inequality yields the equivalent inequality     P (t) < v0 1(d0(0)f 0t(0))
(= D(t)), which in turn is equivalent to  >  (P (t) +D(t)). 
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Derivations for the example after Theorem 2. All functions in the example
satisfy the required di¤erentiability or convexity conditions. At all x  0 we
have v0(x) = ( ( x)a)0 = a( x)a 1. So the inverse v0 : R ! R is at all z  0
given by v0 1(z) =  (z=a)1=(a 1). Hence D(t) = v0 1(d0(0)f 0t(0)) = v0 1(bt) =
 (bt=a)1=(a 1). To minimise P (t) +D(t), note that at all t > 0 this function is
di¤erentiable with derivative
d
dt
[P (t) +D(t)] =
d
dt
"
(t  t)p 

tb
a
 1
a 1
#
= p  (b=a)
1
a 1
a  1 t
1
a 1 1 = p  (b=a)
1
a 1
a  1 t
2 a
a 1 ,
which is zero if and only if
t =

p(a  1)
(b=a)1=(a 1)
a 1
2 a
=

(b=a)1=(a 1)
p(a  1)
a 1
a 2
=
(b=a)1=(a 2)
(p(a  1))(a 1)=(a 2) .
This only stationary point of P (t) +D(t) is indeed a (global) minimum, since
the above expression for d
dt
[P (t) +D(t)] is strictly increasing in t > 0 (using
that a > 2). 
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